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ABSTRACT
Unexpectedly severe winter weather, which is arguably exogenous to rm and bank
fundamentals, represents a signicant cash ow shock for bank-borrowing rms. Firms
respond to these shocks by drawing on and increasing the size of their credit lines.
Banks charge borrowers for this liquidity via increased interest rates and less borrower-
friendly loan provisions. Credit line adjustments occur within one calendar quarter of
the shock and persist for at least nine months. Overall, we provide evidence that bank
credit lines are an important tool for managing the non-fundamental component of cash
ow volatility, especially for solvent small bank borrowers.
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How useful to rms are bank lines of credit? On one hand, Shockley and Thakor (1997)
and Holmstrom and Tirole (1998) argue that credit lines precommit banks to provide debt
nancing when rms face negative shocks. On the other hand, Su (2009) nds that access
to credit lines is restricted following declines in borrower protability  presumably just when
rms most need the nancing. Acharya et al. (2014) explain this behavior by showing that
credit line revocation can serve a liquidity monitoring role, making it optimal for banks to
revoke credit lines when rms most need the credit.1
This paper examines rms' use of credit lines when they face a particular type of liquidity
shock that is not directly related to fundamentals. The shock arises from abnormally heavy
winter snowfall, which disrupts distribution channels and increases operating costs, but does
not cause rms to have long-term operational problems. Focusing on weather-induced cash
ow variability allows us to isolate a pure liquidity shock and largely avoid the confounding
eects of changes in rm's long-term protability on its credit needs and the supply of credit
from banks. We nd that bank borrowers, particularly nancially solvent small rms, rely
extensively on credit lines to manage these cash ow shocks and that lenders charge borrow-
ers for this liquidity provision, providing the rst direct evidence that rms use credit lines
as liquidity insurance against cash ow volatility that is unrelated to rm fundamentals.
Our analysis uses a novel dataset of bank loan portfolios that the Federal Reserve has
collected since 2012. The dataset contains detailed information on bank loan contracts at
the quarterly frequency, including credit line limits, credit line utilization, and bank loan
characteristics. In addition, it typically includes a range of borrower characteristics, such
as operating income and total assets, at an annual frequency. Because the dataset covers
the full set of rms in a bank's loan portfolio with outstanding loan commitments of at
least $1 million, our sample includes more small rms than most other research on corporate
liquidity management. In our sample the average credit line is 24% of total assets, which
is approximately 50% larger than the corresponding average for the publicly traded rms
1Also see the model and discussion in Almeida et al. (2014).
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studied in Su (2009).
This sample oers a unique opportunity to study how the typical bank-borrowing rm
uses credit lines as a liquidity management tool. To address the question of whether credit
lines are used to manage cash ow shocks that are exogenous to rm and market condi-
tions, we introduce abnormally severe local winter weather as a shock to corporate cash
ows. We obtain data on winter weather at the county level from the National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). We nd that abnormally-severe winter weather
signicantly aects total annual rm-level cash ows. For example, a one standard deviation
increase in a county's abnormal snow cover in January thru March reduces the annual cash
ow of rms headquartered in that county by 0.22% of total assets. Partitioning by indus-
try, we nd a negative relation between snow cover and cash ow in each of the top eight
sectors that collectively comprise 87% of our sample. The eect is statistically signicant
at the 10% level or better for the transportation, real estate, construction, manufacturing,
retail, and (using a secondary measure of abnormal snow cover) wholesale industries. Given
that we nd no signicant relation between abnormal snow cover and sales, our ndings are
consistent with severe winter weather increasing operating costs for rms in industries that
operate predominantly outdoors and/or are reliant on a transportation-dependent supply
chain.
We employ two dierent empirical approaches to investigate how rms manage weather-
induced cash ow shocks. First, we use the abnormal winter snow cover in the county of
a rm's headquarters as an instrumental variable (IV) for annual cash ows. This allows
us to examine the relation between cash ow shocks and end-of-year corporate outcomes,
such as credit line draws, credit line size adjustments, and changes in cash, working capital,
and trade credit. Second, we estimate the direct relation between abnormal winter snow
cover and credit line outcomes. One key benet of this reduced form approach is that we
can study credit line usage within a larger and more complete panel of rms because we do
not lose observations with missing or inconsistent nancial statement information. In either
2
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case, our identifying assumption is that severe winter weather aects corporate liquidity
management only through its eect on current cash ows. The temporary nature of our
severe winter weather measure makes this assumption plausible. Unlike highly destructive
natural disaster events such as hurricanes or earthquakes, abnormal snow cover is unlikely
to aect investment opportunities or access to capital, except through its aect on the cash
ows of current projects. Our empirical results are similar if we exclude the most extreme
snow events (which may aect rm fundamentals for reasons other than reduced cash ows).
The purpose of our two-stage least squares (2SLS) procedure is to isolate the causal
eect of a one dollar change in cash ows. As such, a magnitude of 1 (in absolute value),
which indicates that the second stage outcome changes dollar for dollar with weather-induced
changes in cash ow, is a natural benchmark for evaluating our coecient estimates. We
estimate that, on average, annual credit line draws increase by approximately 50 cents for
every $1 reduction in annual cash ow. In addition, the IV estimates indicate a signicant
negative relation between cash ow and changes in credit line limits of similar magnitude.
Our reduced form estimates are qualitatively similar: abnormal snow cover is positively and
signicantly related to credit line draws and changes in credit line size. These results are
driven by the sub-set of rms who actively use credit lines and have little excess slack at the
time of the cash ow shock. Overall, our ndings show that bank borrowers rely extensively
on credit lines to manage non-fundamental cash ow shocks, and that banks accommodate
borrowers who draw down their credit lines by adjusting credit line limits.
To investigate whether rms in our sample also use cash to buer weather-induced cash
ow shocks, we employ the same 2SLS approach with change in cash holdings as the sec-
ond stage dependent variable. We nd a statistically insignicant end-of-year cash balance
decrease of approximately 18 cents for every $1 decrease in annual cash ow. We also nd
insignicant relations between cash ow and changes in both non-cash working capital and
trade credit. The fact that these outcomes are measured at the end of the year means that
there may be a short-run role for cash, working capital, or trade credit in managing unan-
3
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ticipated cash ow shocks, however by the end of the calendar year there is no signicant
change along these dimensions.
To better understand the timing of credit line responses to abnormal winter weather,
we regress quarterly credit line outcomes directly on abnormal winter snow cover. We nd
that rms respond to abnormal snow in the rst calendar quarter by drawing on their credit
line in the rst half of the year and expanding the size of credit lines in the second quarter
(i.e., between April 1 and June 30). Consistent with our regression results on annual credit
line use, there is no reversal in the next two quarters, suggesting that rms use credit lines
to address liquidity needs in the nine months following short-term shocks. We also nd no
evidence that borrowers anticipate future abnormal snow as there is no relation between
credit line activity and next year's abnormal snow.2
We next examine whether banks adjust interest rates or other loan contract provisions
when providing liquidity for non-fundamental cash ow shocks. We nd that interest rates
increase following weather-induced cash ow reductions. In addition, loans become shorter
in maturity, more likely to be secured, and less likely to have xed interest rates.3 Thus,
one reason that banks accommodate borrowers' liquidity demands following exogenous cash
ow shocks appears to be that they can charge borrowers for this service, both in terms of
higher interest rates and less borrower-friendly loan terms.
Finally, we examine whether rms' reliance on credit lines as a tool for managing exoge-
nous cash ow shocks varies by borrower size, credit quality, or the geographical distance
between the borrower and the lender. We nd that the statistical signicance of our main
results (i.e., the credit line draws, the credit line expansion, and the interest rate increase) is
concentrated in the 80% of our sample with below $100 million in total assets. In addition,
2We further support our identifying assumption that borrowers do not anticipate future abnormal snow
by showing that immediately prior to the realization of the shock borrower-years experiencing positive
abnormal snow shocks are observably similar to borrowers-years experiencing negative shocks.
3Data limitations prevent us from examining the use of loan covenants.
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the results are strongest for rms located in close geographical proximity to their lenders.
Finally, we nd no signicant eects among the lowest credit quality borrowers (i.e., the 19%
of our sample with ratings of B or lower). Although these partitions are endogenous and
not mutually exclusive, they provide some descriptive support for the idea that bank credit
is a particularly important source of liquidity for smaller local rms (e.g., Berger and Udell
(1995)) but may not be available for borrowers with high credit risk (e.g., Diamond (1991)).
Our ndings provide novel evidence that, for solvent smaller rms, bank credit lines are
an important tool for managing the non-fundamental component of cash ow volatility.4 De-
spite the widespread use of credit lines, most prior evidence comes from surveys or studies of
how larger rms use credit lines when facing severe nancial market disruptions or dealing
with long-term operational problems.5 Another key feature of the existing literature is a
focus on how credit lines are used to manage general (overall) cash ow volatility, which
is driven by both endogenous and exogenous factors. This makes simple Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS) regressions of credit line use on cash ows dicult to interpret.6 Regressing
credit line use directly on cash ows (and our full set of control variables) in our sample
exemplies the importance of these confounding factors; OLS estimates indicate that cash
ows are unrelated to credit line draw downs and positively related to credit line size, which
diers substantially from the large negative eects we document in the 2SLS regressions.
In addition to being consistent with theories arguing that credit lines are a valuable and
ecient liquidity management tool (e.g., Shockley and Thakor (1997); Holmstrom and Ti-
role (1998)) and that banks are ideal providers of this liquidity (e.g., Kashyap et al. (2002);
4See Acharya et al. (2013), Jimenez et al. (2009), Yun (2009), Lins et al. (2010), Demiroglu et al. (2012),
and Demiroglu and James (2011) for evidence on other uses of credit lines.
5For example, see Su (2009), Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010), Campello et al. (2011), Campello et al.
(2012), Acharya et al. (2014), and Berospide and Meisenzahl (2016).
6For example, negative protability shocks can lead to less credit line usage because of covenant violations
and bank monitoring (e.g., Su (2009); Acharya et al. (2014); Gustafson et al. (2019)), or greater credit line
usage via a liquidity management mechanism (e.g., Holmstrom and Tirole (1998); Campello et al. (2011)).
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Gatev and Strahan (2006)), our ndings also contribute to the broader liquidity management
literature (e.g., Almeida et al. (2004); Denis and Sibilkov (2010); Campello et al. (2011)).
As Almeida et al. (2014) discuss, this literature emphasizes the increasing importance of
cash holdings as a liquidity management tool, particularly for nancially constrained rms
that face large aggregate liquidity risks. By showing that banks provide liquidity insurance
to smaller local rms that are susceptible to cash ow shocks but not in a position to fully
manage them with internal funds, our ndings relate to the large literature on the value of
lending relationships, suggesting a specic channel through which banking relationships are
valuable.7
Finally, we contribute to a growing literature on the eects of natural events on rm
decision-making and economic activity (e.g., Giroud et al. (2012); Bloesch and Gourio (2015);
Chen et al. (2017); Dessaint and Matray (2017)). We identify an important role of banks
in helping small rms deal with these unanticipated weather events. In so doing, our work
complements recent evidence showing that local banks play an important role in mitigating
the negative eects of natural disasters (Cortes (2014); Cortes and Strahan (2016); Koetter
et al. (2019)).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section I describes the sample and
data. Sections II and III discuss the relation between severe weather and corporate cash ows
as well as how this supports our identication strategy. Section IV presents our main results,
which provide evidence on how rms manage exogenous cash ow shocks. Section V exam-
ines how cash ow shocks impact bank loan provisions and Section VI explores heterogeneity
in our main results. Finally, Section VII concludes.
7A number of studies explore the impact and value of lending relationships, particularly for smaller rms.
For example, see James and Wier (1990), Petersen and Rajan (1994), Berger and Udell (1995), Petersen
and Rajan (1995), Blackwell and Winters (1997), Houston and James (2001), Ongena and Smith (2001),
Petersen and Rajan (2002), Berger et al. (2005), and Fuss and Vermeulen (2008).
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I. Data Construction and Sample Descriptive Statistics
A. Federal Reserve's Y-14Q collection
Our main data source is Schedule H.1 of the Federal Reserve's Y-14Q data collection.
This data collection began in June of 2012 to support the Dodd-Frank Stress Tests and the
Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review. The reporting panel includes bank holding
companies exceeding US $50 billion in total assets. The 35 institutions in the Y-14 collec-
tion provide loan-level data on their corporate loan portfolio whenever a loan exceeds $1
million in commitment exposure.8 We restrict the sample to domestic borrowers, excluding
government entities, individual borrowers, foreign entities, and nonprot organizations.
The dataset contains quarterly information on bank loan characteristics and annual infor-
mation from borrowers' nancial statements. Thus, our analyses using rm-level character-
istics require a rm-year panel.9 To compute borrower-level outcomes within this rm-year
panel, we aggregate all loan-level variables across all lenders in a given borrower-year.10
For many of our empirical analyses we require data on changes or levels of nancial vari-
ables such as total assets, xed assets, cash and marketable securities, non-cash working
capital, total liabilities, total sales, total debt, accounts receivable, accounts payable, and
EBITDA, which we use as our measure of cash ow. In addition, we require at least two
8As Bidder et al. (2016) document, the commercial loans in the Y-14 data represent approximately 70%
of all commercial loans extended in the United States.
9To avoid duplicate observations (due to some rms reporting their nancials more than once in the
year) we keep the nancial statement information with a reporting date closest to the end of each calendar
year, which typically are the nancials as of Q4.
10This aggregation may bias the total bank borrowing of large rms downward to the extent that their
loans are syndicated to non-Y14 banks, smaller banks, and nonbanks. This bias is mitigated by the fact that
syndicated credit lines are almost always held by banks and Y-14 reporting banks participate in approxi-
mately 98% of all banks credit line exposure in the Shared National Credit data between 2011 and 2015.
Therefore, changes in the committed and utilized shares of Y-14 banks are likely to mirror changes in overall
credit lines.
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consecutive years of bank nancing information so that we can compute changes in credit
line limits and utilization. After imposing these restrictions, our sample consists of 102,742
rm-year observations during the period 2012 to 2016. We also replicate all of our results
with an expanded sample, which relaxes the requirement of nancial statement information.
This sample, which only requires information on bank borrowing, contains up to 189,312
borrower-year observations.11 We winsorize all nancial and loan variables with the excep-
tion of loan interest rate at the 1st and 99th percentiles to mitigate the eect of outliers.
Before collapsing the loan-level data to the borrower-year level, we trim the interest rate
variable at the 1st and 99th percentiles to eliminate data errors. See Appendix A for more
detailed description of the data cleaning.
B. Descriptive Statistics
Table I reports descriptive statistics for the sample with complete nancial statement
reports. Small rms dominate our sample. The 75th percentile of the book value of total as-
sets is $92.64 million, and the average size of rms falling below this threshold is only $22.22
million. The rms we study are thus substantially smaller than the majority of rms in
studies using COMPUSTAT and survey data. For example, Campello et al. (2011) consider
rms small if their sales are less than $1 billion, whereas the 75th percentile of sales in our
sample is $170.59 million (unreported), corresponding to 3.03 times total asset value.
The rms in our sample are more levered than the typical COMPUSTAT rm, with av-
erage liabilities- and total debt-to-assets ratios of approximately 61% and 32%, respectively.
This extensive reliance on bank debt is likely magnied by our sample being restricted to
bank borrowing rms, but is broadly consistent with the evidence on small-rm borrowing
in Robb and Robinson (2014).
11For some of our analyses that do not require rm nancials, we further expand the sample to a rm-
year-quarter panel of bank debt characteristics in order to more precisely pin down the timing of credit line
usage.
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The average credit line size is approximately 24% of total assets, which is considerably
larger than the average ratio of credit line commitments to total assets among the publicly-
traded rms reported in recent studies (e.g., Su (2009)). There is also substantial variation
in line size. The 75th percentile of credit line size is approximately 35% of total assets, while
the 25th percentile is only 9%. Average (median) cash holdings are 10% (5%) of total assets,
which is somewhat less than the typical public rm (e.g., Bates et al. (2009)).
II. Severe Weather and Cash Flow
There is ample anecdotal evidence suggesting that abnormally severe weather may neg-
atively impact rm cash ows, even at the annual level. This idea manifested during the
abnormally cold winters in the Northeast United States during 2014 and 2015. A CNBC
report in February of 2014 on the manufacturing sector contains a long list of companies
detailing the impact of severe winter weather. For example, Fabricated Metal Products
cited poor weather impacting their outbound and inbound shipments, and Plastics & Rub-
ber Products stated that they experienced many late deliveries due to truck lines being shut
down.12 There is also no shortage of anecdotes in other industries. For example, Todd Smith,
VP Sales, at Leonard's Express, a mid-sized trucking company summarizes the eect that
winter storms can have in his industry, stating a midsized trucking company can easily see
a nancial hit in the tens of thousands of dollars per day due to factors such as fuel and
equipment expenses, snow removal, and accident costs.13
To the extent that severe winter weather has an impact on cash ow, it provides a unique
opportunity to investigate the role of credit lines in managing non-fundamental cash ow
shocks. The reason for this is that unexpectedly bad winter weather is unlikely to impact
12See the February 5, 2014 article entitled Here's how bad winter weather is hurting the economy
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long-run rm outcomes except through its eect on the cash ows of current projects. This is
especially true if the severe weather is measured over a relatively short interval and extreme
severe weather incidents, which may destroy a jurisdiction's infrastructure and aect the
rm's long-run growth prospects, are excluded from the measure.
A. Measuring Severe Winter Weather
There are a variety of ways to measure severe winter weather, and the extent to which
severe winter weather aects corporate cash ow is an empirical question. We use normalized
measures of severe winter weather, capturing the component of winter weather that rms
are not already prepared for. Our primary measure of abnormal weather is based on the
average daily snow cover during the rst quarter of each year, although results are similar
using the 95th percentile of daily snow cover during the rst quarter (i.e., the snow cover
on the fourth snowiest day of the quarter). The reason we choose snow cover as our main
measure is because it combines the intuitive negative eects that both snowfall and cold
winter weather may have on rms' cash ows.
We construct these measures using county-level data on daily snow cover (in inches) from
the NOAA's website. The NOAA reports daily snow cover (SNWD) for each weather station
in the United States. For each day and county, we rst compute the average value of snow
cover across weather stations. Results are similar using the median. We then calculate the
average and 95th percentile of daily snow cover in each county-quarter between 2000 and
2016. We aggregate these values into a baseline average of snow cover in the rst calendar
quarter for each county-year using data from the previous 10 years. Results are robust to
dening benchmark weather conditions using a xed ten year period from 2001 through 2010.
We dene Abnormal Snow as the dierence between the average daily snow cover during
the rst quarter in a given county-year minus the county's average daily snow cover in the
rst quarter during the previous ten years. Abnormal Snow 95 is dened similarly using the
95th percentile (instead of the average) of daily snow cover in the rst quarter.
10
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Panels A and B of Figure 1 present the distribution of these two abnormal snow mea-
sures over our sample period. For the sake of presentation, all of these metrics are divided
by 1,000. The gures show a large dispersion in abnormal snow during our sample period,
and show that there are a signicant number of observations with extreme outcomes. There
is also a large cluster of abnormal snow cover observations near zero.
Our results are not sensitive to trimming the abnormal snow measures at 3 standard de-
viations (which drops approximately 8.5% of observations) or dropping areas that experience
no snow cover in the previous ten years. Thus, our results are not driven by the most severe
or unexpected winter weather events. A byproduct of our results being driven by marginal
changes in winter snow cover (as opposed to devastating blizzards or hurricanes) is that it is
reasonable to assume that our abnormal snow measures are unrelated to a borrower's future
investment opportunities or a lender's ability to supply liquidity.
B. Abnormal Weather and Cash Flow
Although our abnormal snow measures are unlikely to aect the attractiveness of future
investments, it is possible that winter snow cover aects the cash ows of ongoing projects.
To investigate this empirical question, we regress annual cash ow on abnormal snow cover,
rm-specic control variables, and a set of industry x year-quarter and county xed eects.
Therefore, we identify the eect of winter weather on cash ows using only within-county
severe weather variation over time, while the industry x year-quarter xed eects control for
macro-economic conditions even to the extent that they aect specic industries (dened at
the 4-digit NAICS level). Notably, to the extent that the eects of rst quarter snow storms
reverse before the end of the year we expect to nd no relation between abnormal winter
11
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snow cover and annual cash ows. Equation 1 details this specication:
Cash F lowit =α0 + α1Abnormal Snowjt + α2Fixed Assetsit−1+
α3Log(Assets)it−1 + α4Leveraget−1 + α5Salest−1+
α6Casht−1 + α7Debtt−1 + α8WorkCapt−1 + γX + εit, (1)
where Cash F lowit denotes the cash ow (i.e., EBITDA) realization of rm i in year t, and
Abnormal Snowjt denotes the abnormal snow cover in Q1 for county j corresponding to the
location of the headquarters of rm i at time t. We include a standard set of rm control
variables, which we formally dene in Appendix B. All of these controls are measured as
of the beginning of the period over which cash ow is measured. X is a vector of 4-digit
NAICS industry x year-quarter and county xed eects.
Table II reports estimates of Equation 1. Comparing Column 1 with Column 2 and
Column 3 with Column 4 shows that the inclusion of control variables has little eect on the
relation between severe winter weather and corporate cash ows. This evidence is consistent
with our measures of abnormal snow triggering cash ow shocks that are unrelated to pre-
shock rm fundamentals.
Across all four columns there is a negative and statistically signicant relation between
abnormal snow cover and corporate cash ows. Focusing on Columns 2 and 4, which include
the full set of control variables, Abnormal Snow and Abnormal Snow 95 both have t-
statistics of approximately −4.4. Given that the standard deviation of Abnormal Snow is
0.0784, the coecient of −0.028 in Column 2 suggests that a one standard deviation increase
in average snow cover results in an annual cash ow decrease of approximately 0.22% of total
assets. A cash ow shock of this magnitude is approximately 0.011 standard deviations of
annual cash ow (or 1.4% of average cash ow), consistent with abnormally severe winter
weather having an important impact on total annual corporate cash ows.
Undoubtedly, there is signicant heterogeneity in the eect of Abnormal Snow on cash
12
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ows. The small and mid-sized rms in our sample are more likely to be aected by county-
level measures of abnormal snow than large rms because their operations will be more
concentrated around the corporate headquarters. For example, we nd no consistent evidence
that abnormally severe winter weather in the headquarter county of COMPUSTAT rms
signicantly aects annual cash ows. In addition, although a negative relation between
cash ows and severe winter weather can be rationalized across a wide range of industries,
the magnitude of the relation will likely vary by industry.
To examine this heterogeneity, Table III presents separate estimates of Equation 1 for
the eight sectors contributing at least 4% of the borrower-year observations. Given these are
within-industry specications, we include state and year xed eects and the standard errors
are adjusted for heteroskedasticity. In each of these eight sectors there is a negative relation
between both measures of abnormal snow cover and cash ow. The eect is statistically
signicant at the 10% level or better in the transportation, real estate, construction, and
retail sectors using either measure of abnormal snow. In addition, transportation, real estate
and construction account for three of the four largest coecients using Abnormal Snow and
the three largest coecients using Abnormal Snow 95.14 The coecients in the wholesale
and manufacturing sectors are each statistically signicant using one of the two measures.
To better understand the cross-industry variation in the relation between abnormal snow
and corporate cash ows, Appendix Table AI replicates Table III using sales, instead of cash
ow, as the dependent variable. None of the coecient estimates are statistically signicant
and more than half are positive. Thus, the relation between abnormal snow and cash ows
is driven by severe winter weather increasing companies' operating costs. Inspecting the
industries for which cash ows are most impacted by winter weather reveals two common
themes industries with signicant outdoor operations and industries reliant on a supply
chain that operates extensively outdoors (see Cachon et al. (2012)).
14The third largest coecient using Abnormal Snow is in the business services sector. This coecient is
statistically insignicant.
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III. Identication Strategies
The results in Section II show that abnormal snow leads to a reduction in annual cash
ows. In this section, we introduce two empirical strategies to identify how rms manage
these weather-induced cash ow shocks.
A. Two-stage Least Squares
Our rst empirical strategy is a two-stage least squares (2SLS) procedure. The rst
stage is identical to that in Table II, with our primary specication being the model using
Abnormal Snow and a full set of rm control variables (reported in Column 2). Abnormal Snow
must be a suciently strong predictor of annual cash ows to mitigate weak instrument con-
cerns. The partial F -statistic on Abnormal Snow in Column 2 of Table II is approximately
20, making it unlikely that we encounter bias due to a weak instruments problem. For exam-
ple, Table 2 in Stock and Yogo (2005) shows that, under certain assumptions, the potential
bias of the IV estimate attributable to weak instruments is less than 10% of the size of the
IV coecient whenever the rst-stage F -statistic is 16 or higher.
In the second stage we regress corporate outcomes, many of which relate to bank bor-
rowing, on the predicted value from this rst stage regression and the same set of controls
(minus our instrumental variable, Abnormal Snow) that we use in the rst stage. Formally,
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we estimate the following system of equations:
Cash F lowit =α0 + α1Abnormal Snowjt + α2Fixed Assetsit−1+
α3Log(Assets)it−1 + α4Leveraget−1 + α5Salest−1+
α6Casht−1 + α7Debtt−1 + α8WorkCapt−1 + γX + εit, (2a)
Yit =β0 + β1 ̂Cash F lowit + β2Fixed Assetsit−1 + β3Log(Assets)it−1+
β4Leveraget−1 + β5Salest−1 + β6Casht−1+
β7Debtt−1 + β8WorkCapt−1 + δX + εit (2b)
where Yit represents the second stage outcome of interest, such as credit line drawdowns,
change in credit line limit, or change in cash. As in our rst stage (i.e., Equation 1) we in-
clude industry-time and county xed eects. County xed eects control for the possibility
that over our six year sample period some counties had a string of bad weather. Includ-
ing county xed eects prevents spurious correlations between credit line use and these
(arguably random) strings of bad weather from inuencing the estimated relation between
Abnormal Snow and our outcomes of interest. We control for time-invariant rm-level het-
erogeneity by dening the dependent variable in terms of within rm changes. In robustness
tests and reduced form estimates of the direct relation between Abnormal Snow and credit
line usage (see Section B) we nd qualitatively similar estimates using rm xed eects.
Due to our short unbalanced panel, the inclusion of rm xed eects substantially reduces
statistical power (the degrees of freedom drop from 100,922 to 48,762) resulting in a three-
to four-fold increase in standard errors for our 2SLS estimates. As we discuss below, this is
less of an issue with our reduced form analysis, which uses a larger sample since it does not
require complete nancial statement information.
We cluster the standard errors at the 4-digit NAICS industry level. This clustering ac-
15
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2963444
counts for within industry correlation in investment opportunities and liquidity demands,
either of which may result in correlated use of credit lines. In unreported tests, we replicate
our analyses double clustering by county-year and industry. This double clustering accounts
for the possibility that credit line use is correlated among rms in the same county at the
same time, perhaps due to variation in local economic conditions or winter weather. Because
this double clustering generally leads to smaller standard error estimates and aects none
of our inferences, we use the (more conservative) industry-level clustering throughout our
analysis.
Under certain assumptions, this 2SLS analysis will identify the marginal eect of weather-
induced cash ow shocks on the second stage outcome. In addition to the testable assumption
that Abnormal Snow is a signicant enough predictor of corporate cash ows, we must as-
sume that weather-induced shocks only aect the outcomes of interest through their eect
on cash ows. Although this exclusion restriction is not directly testable, it is intuitive an
abnormally cold or snowy winter is unlikely to materially impact the protability of future
projects or a rm's access to capital, but (as we nd in Section II) does aect the cash ows
of current projects. This is an important benet of using abnormal snow cover, as opposed
to more extreme weather events, such as hurricanes.
One way this identifying assumption may be violated is if rms can predict and prepare
for abnormally severe winter weather. To the extent they can, severe winter weather may
directly aect a variety of corporate decisions. To mitigate this possibility our measure of
abnormal winter weather, Abnormal Snow, is normalized by the county average snowfall
over the previous ten years. In Appendix Table AII we show that this measure exhibits no
autocorrelation within a county over time.
To further examine the extent to which rms prepare for abnormal winter weather, we
partition the descriptive statistics on our instrument Abnormal Snow. Table IV shows that
the borrower-years leading up to negative and positive weather shocks are similar along
observable dimensions. Average annual cash ows to assets are 0.16 in all 3 terciles of
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Abnormal Snow. Leverage, the ratio of xed-to-total assets, sales-to-assets, cash-to-assets,
and working-capital-to-assets are also very similar across the terciles. On average, rm-years
in the rst tercile are approximately 10% larger in terms of total assets, but at the median
this dierence is smaller and not economically signicant ($21.7 versus $20.2 in total as-
sets). In Column 7 we show that rms in the rst and third terciles of the weather shock
are economically and statistically similar across observable characteristics after controlling
for county and industry-year-quarter xed eects. Five of the eight control variables we
examine (cash ow, leverage, xed assets, cash, and working captital) are identical to the
third decimal point in the rst and third terciles in the year prior to the shock. The only
dierence that is statistically signicant at the 5% level is sales-to-assets, but the dierence
is economically small (less than 0.5% of the average sales-to-assets ratios).
In Table AIII we examine whether historical exposure to signicant winter snowfall aects
how rms use their credit lines. Specically, we present average credit line drawn amounts by
industry-calendar quarter for rms located in areas in the top, middle, and bottom terciles
of historical snow cover. We nd little evidence of dierential credit line use in areas exposed
to more snow. Overall, exposure to severe winter weather does not appear to concentrate
around a specic type of rm or result in long-term changes in rms' liquidity management
policies, which supports our identifying assumptions.
B. Reduced-form
An important limitation to the 2SLS analysis is that the requirement for complete nan-
cial statement information (including the rm's cash ows) signicantly reduces the sample
size (by around 45%) and biases the sample toward larger rms. The reduction in sample size
occurs because we lose some rms entirely, while for other rms full nancials are missing
in some, but not all, years.
To overcome this limitation of our 2SLS sample, we introduce a second identication
strategy in which we regress our second stage outcomes directly on Abnormal Snow. This
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reduced-form specication does not require nancial statement information, which greatly
expands the sample and provides a more complete panel of rm-year observations, giving us
more statistical power to include rm xed eects (in addition to the 4-digit NAICS industry
x year-quarter xed eects).
Specically, we estimate the following equation:
Yit =γ0 + γ1Abnormal Snowjt + θX + εit, (3)
where Yit is the outcome variable of interest and X contains rm and industry x year-
quarter xed eects. Under the same identifying assumptions that underly our 2SLS proce-
dure, any relation between Abnormal Snow and rm-level outcomes is due to the eect of
Abnormal Snow on the rm's cash ows.
IV. Managing Exogenous Cash Flow Shocks
Most evidence on credit lines is based on samples of larger rms and/or includes rms
facing long-term operational problems. This evidence sheds little light on role of banks and
credit lines in helping solvent rms manage short-run liquidity shocks. In this section we
abstract away from the complex relations between cash ow volatility, long-term protability,
and credit line access, honing in on the liquidity role of credit lines in managing cash ow
shocks that are arguably exogenous to borrower and lender fundamentals.
A. Credit Line Drawdowns
In Panel A of Table V we investigate the extent to which rms draw down credit lines
when facing a weather-induced cash ow shock. Column 1 of Table V presents an OLS
regression in which the dependent variable is the year over year change in drawn credit line
amount scaled by the beginning of period total assets. The explanatory variable of interest
is cash ow. The OLS analysis in column 1 reveals no signicant relation between cash ow
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and credit line drawdowns, with a point estimate of −0.000 in magnitude. It is dicult to
pinpoint the driving forces behind this estimate given the correlation between cash ows and
omitted variables, such as investment opportunities and the availability of credit.
In Columns 2 to 4 of Panel A in Table V we present the 2SLS results, which isolate the
eect of weather-induced cash ow uctuations on credit line draws. Columns 2 and 3 use
the average daily abnormal snow cover in the rst calendar quarter (Abnormal Snow) to
instrument for annual cash ow. The coecient estimates are −0.407 and −0.425, respec-
tively, and are statistically signicant. We nd qualitatively similar second-stage estimates
for the eect of cash ows on credit line use whether or not we include the time-varying
rm controls, which is consistent with abnormal snow being unrelated to rm fundamentals.
Column 4 shows that the 2SLS estimate is −0.524 and statistically signicant when we use
Abnormal Snow 95 as an IV for cash ow. These ndings suggest that rms with access
to bank debt cover approximately half of a weather related cash ow shock with credit line
draws. This estimate is intuitive relative to the natural benchmark of −1.00, which would
indicate that the rm managed the entire cash ow shock with credit line draws. In par-
ticular, Jiang (2017) highlights the need to anticipate the 2SLS magnitude and reconcile it
with economic reality checks, particularly in cases such as ours where the 2SLS estimate is
signicantly larger in magnitude than the OLS estimate.15
These ndings highlight the value of our two-stage procedure. By focusing on weather-
induced variablity in cash ow, we identify the eect of cash ow changes on credit line
draws in a manner that is not confounded by the high correlations between cash ows and
other economic factors. Our results suggest that these correlations between cash ow and
other factors are suciently strong to camouage the extent to which credit lines are used
15See Section 3 of Jiang (2017). Another explanation for the larger 2SLS coecient is that 2SLS identies
a local average treatment eect, where locality is determined by a rm's cash ow sensitivity to abnormally
severe winter weather. Thus, the larger 2SLS coecient could be because the rms that are most sensitive
to our instrument (which Table 2 suggests are those in outdoor sectors or sectors that rely on an outdoor
supply chain) happen to also have a larger sensitivity of credit line use to cash ows.
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to buer unanticipated, non-fundamental shocks to cash ow.
We conduct several additional robustness tests in Appendix Table AIV that oer cir-
cumstantial support for our identifying assumption that abnormally severe winter weather
aects rm outcomes only through its eect on corporate cash ows. Column 1 replicates our
analysis using a trimmed weather IV that drops the most extreme abnormal snow outcomes
(i.e., the 8.5% of our sample that is more than three standard deviations away from the
county's average over the past ten years). We obtain a very similar coecient estimate of
−0.562. Column 2 shows that our ndings are also similar (with a point estimate of −0.448)
after dropping areas that have experienced no snow over the previous decade. Taken to-
gether, these robustness analyses mitigate the concern that extreme weather events aecting
investment opportunities or the population's expectations regarding future weather drive our
ndings.
Despite our outcomes of interest being measured as within-rm changes, it is possible
that there are some time invariant rm characteristics that are related to both adverse winter
weather and changes in credit line draw downs. We conduct a variety of analyses to mitigate
the possibility that such time invariant rm characteristics drive our results. In Column 3 of
Appendix Table AIV we control for such characteristics by adding rm xed eects to our
2SLS specication. The point estimate for the eect of cash ows on credit line draw downs
increases in size to -0.749, which is not consistent with the estimated eect in Column 3 of
Table V being driven by time invariant rm characteristics. However, the inclusion of rm
xed eects results in the standard errors increasing almost four-fold (from 0.189 to 0.696)
making the coecient of interest statistically insignicant at conventional levels (with a t-
statistic of approximately -1.1). This increase in standard errors is not surprising given that
the inclusion of rm xed eects reduces the degrees of freedom by approximately 52%.16
16Including rm xed eects reduces the sample from 102,742, to 77,662 observations. In this smaller sam-
ple there are 28,892 rm xed eects included in the regression leaving 48,762 degrees of freedom (compared
to the 100,922 in the 2SLS specication in Column 3 of Table V).
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In Panel B of Table V we present results of our reduced-form approach. Here, we regress
credit line draws (scaled by the beginning of period total borrower loan commitments) di-
rectly on Abnormal Snow. In Columns 1 through 3 we continue to use a sample that requires
nancial statement information, as in the 2SLS analysis. Column 1 includes no rm-level
controls or rm xed eects (like Column 2 of Panel A), while Column 2 adds rm xed
eects (as in Column 3 of Appendix Table AIV) and Column 3 adds rm-level controls (as in
Column 3 of Panel A). The statistical signicance on these reduced form estimates is qual-
itatively similar to the 2SLS estimates in Panel A. In all three columns we nd a positive
relation between Abnormal Snow and credit line draw downs with the point estimates falling
in a narrow band between 0.031 and 0.032. The similarity of the point estimates in Columns
1, 2, and 3 corroborate the evidence from Panel A that the relation between Abnormal Snow
and credit line activity is orthogonal to the relation between rm characteristics and draw
downs. Again, the point estimate becomes statistically insignicant in the smaller sample
that includes rm xed eects.
In Column 4 we conduct a similar analysis using an expanded sample that does not
require nancial statement information. This increases our sample size by approximately
87%, but the relation between Abnormal Snow and credit line draw downs remains similar
with a highly statistically signicant point estimate of 0.027. This is encouraging because it
suggests that the relation between credit line activity and Abnormal Snow is not fundamen-
tally dierent for the subset of borrowers for which we do not observe nancial statement
information.
In Column 5 we exploit the more complete panel used in Column 4 and add rm xed
eects. The coecient does not change at all in magnitude and remains statistically sig-
nicant at the 10% level, although the sample size decreases from 189,312 to 164,603. The
similarity of the coecients after the inclusion of rm xed eects suggests that the re-
lation between abnormal winter weather and credit line draws is not due to unobserved
time-invariant rm-specic characteristics.
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B. Credit Line Size Adjustments
Next, we investigate whether cash ow shocks cause rms to adjust their credit line
size. Credit lines of public rms are frequently renegotiated  Roberts and Su (2009) and
Roberts (2015) nd that the average bank loan in their sample is renegotiated once every
6 to 9 months, and that most renegotiations are not due to impending covenant violations.
Within our sample, credit line sizes are adjusted in almost half of rm-years. This raises
the possibility that banks work with rms to adjust available credit in response to weather-
induced cash ow shocks.
Interestingly, the OLS evidence in Column 1 of Table VI indicates the opposite relation.
When cash ow is high, credit line size expands. This is consistent with protable rms
having greater demand for, or access to, bank credit. This is also consistent with Su
(2009), who nds that the availability of credit lines can be dependent on maintaining high
levels of cash ow, as lenders may use nancial covenants to force loan renegotiation and
reduce credit line availability following cash ow shortfalls (also see Smith (1993) and Smith
and Warner (1979)).
Column 2 explores whether banks work with rms to manage non-fundamental liquidity
shocks using IV regressions with the change in credit line size (scaled by beginning of period
total assets) as the second stage dependent variable. The 2SLS results show a negative
relation between exogenous cash ow shocks and credit line size. The coecient of −0.526
indicates that a one dollar reduction in cash ow due to the weather shock is associated with
an approximately 53 cent increase in end-of-year credit line size. Thus, although the OLS
regressions show that general cash ow variability is positively associated with credit line
size, the 2SLS results indicate that banks accommodate weather-induced cash ow shocks
with credit line adjustments.
Appendix Table AV shows that these results are robust to using Abnormal Snow 95 to
instrument for cash ows, dropping areas experiencing extremely large snow shocks, dropping
areas that did not experience any snow in the previous decade, or removing the rm-level
22
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2963444
control variables. Across the rst four columns of Appendix Table AV the coecient of
interest ranges from −0.495 to −0.841. Column 5 shows a coecient of similar magnitude
(−0.869) after including rm xed eects. However, as in our analysis of credit line draws,
including the rm xed eects in our 2SLS framework substantially increases the standard
errors (and reduces the degrees of freedom), leading to a statistically insignicant coecient
estimate.
In the last two columns of Table VI we use our reduced form specication and the
larger sample that does not require nancial statement information. In these specications
we scale the change in credit line size by total bank loan commitments as of the previous
year (rather than total assets). Using this reduced form specication we nd a signicant
negative relation between changes in credit line size and Abnormal Snow. The coecient
on Abnormal Snow is similar in magnitude and statistical signicance whether or not rm
xed eects are included in the regression.
Together, the results in Tables V and VI indicate that bank-borrowing rms use their
credit lines to manage non-fundamental liquidity shocks. Not only do these rms use existing
credit line capacity when faced with weather-induced cash ow shocks, but they are also able
to work with their lender to expand available credit. These adjustments are not apparent,
even among bank-borrowing rms, without isolating the non-fundamental component of
overall cash ow volatility.
We posit that the reason rms seek this additional credit is to maintain sucient liquidity
as they draw down their existing credit line. Consistent with this idea, we cannot reject the
null hypothesis that the credit line drawdown (in Table V) is the same magnitude as the
credit line size increase (in Table VI). Additionally, Table VII shows that the relation between
Abnormal Snow and credit line draws and line size adjustments is concentrated in the sample
of rms with low ex ante credit line slack. Focusing on rms with a credit line in place in
the previous year, we partition rms into the Low Slack (Slack) group if the ratio of their
unused-to-total credit line commitments at the beginning of the year is below (above) the
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25th percentile. Whether we include county- (Panel A) or rm-xed eects (Panel B), there
is a positive and statistically signicant association between Abnormal Snow and credit line
draws and line size changes only in the sub-sample of rms with Low Slack. These results
help explain why the credit line size adjusts dollar for dollar with credit line draws - rms
that draw on their line have limited excess credit line capacity.17
C. Other Liquidity Management Tools
The results presented thus far suggest that approximately half of every dollar of cash
ow that a rm exogenously gains (or loses) is reected in a change in the end-of-year credit
line balance. In the next set of tests, we examine whether rms manage the remainder of
the exogenous cash ow shock along other dimensions that we can observe. Specically,
we test the relation between weather-induced cash ow shocks and annual changes in cash
balances, xed assets, trade credit, and total debt. A limitation to our study is that we
do not observe an exhaustive list of the potential liquidity buers available to rms, such
as reducing corporate payouts, increasing equity issuance, using nancial hedges, or cutting
costs (in forms unrelated to operating cash ows).
Column 1 of Table VIII presents 2SLS estimates where the second stage dependent vari-
able is the annual change in cash balance, scaled by beginning of year total assets. Although
the relation between weather-induced cash ow shocks and changes in end-of-year cash bal-
ances is not signicant at conventional levels (with a t-statistic of approximately 1.5), the
point estimate of 0.18 suggests that 18 cents of every dollar lost due to weather-induced cash
ows manifests as a reduction in the end-of-year cash balance. In Column 2 we nd that the
liquidity buers at rms' disposal are sucient to prevent weather-induced cash ow shocks
from signicantly aecting real activities (measured as a change in xed assets).
17One explanation for these results is that rms that use credit lines to manage weather-induced cash
ow shocks also actively use their credit lines in response to other liquidity shocks, whereas rms with ample
credit line slack have credit lines in place for investment purposes, such as mergers and acquisitions.
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Several studies show that trade credit is another way rms can manage liquidity shocks
(see e.g., Petersen and Rajan (1997), Giannetti et al. (2011), Garcia-Appendini and Montoriol-
Garriga (2013), and Shenoy and Williams (2017)). We examine this possibility in Column 3,
but nd little evidence of a relation between cash ow shocks and changes in net trade credit.
For the analysis presented in Column 3 we measure trade credit as accounts receivable minus
accounts payable divided by lagged sales. We continue to nd no signicant relation between
weather-induced cash ows and trade credit if we focus separately on accounts receivable or
accounts payable, or if we scale by lagged total assets instead of total sales. Although these
proxies are similar to the measures used in the literature (see e.g., Murn and Njoroge (2014),
Barrot (2016), and Chod et al. (2019)), we cannot rule out measurement error in our proxies
for trade credit as a possible explanation for the null results. Another likely explanation for
the lack of an important trade credit eect is that the data is only available at an annual
frequency, and any trade credit that is extended to address the cash ow shock is repaid
within the year. In unreported tests, we also nd no signicant changes in non-cash working
capital, which includes net trade credit as well as other line items, such as inventories.
Finally, in Column 4 we show that the eect of weather-induced cash ow shocks on
the year-over-year change in total debt is very similar to the the credit line draw eect we
document in Table V. This implies that credit line draws represent the vast majority of the
increase in total debt in response to weather-induced cash ow shocks.
Overall, the point estimates in Tables V and VIII suggest that for every dollar an exoge-
nous cash ow shock costs a rm, approximately 50 cents is reected in increased credit line
draws, and approximately 18 cents is reected in reduced cash by the end of the year. Thus,
credit lines are an important tool rms use to manage exogenous cash ow shocks, although
it remains likely that rms manage a portion of exogenous cash ow shocks in other less
observable ways.
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D. Quarterly Credit Line Adjustments
Until this point, we have focused on end-of-year outcomes, which represent two to four
quarter liquidity buers. Although we do not observe quarterly nancial statements, we
do observe quarterly credit line activity. Thus, we can use our reduced-form analysis to
examine the relation between severe rst quarter snow and credit line activity on a quarterly
basis. In Figure 2 we decompose the annual eect of Abnormal Snow on the change in
credit line drawn amount into its quarterly components. The gure is estimated from four
regressions, one for each calendar quarter. Each regression regresses changes in credit line
activity between the end of the previous year and the end of the calendar quarter denoted
on the x-axis on Abnormal Snow. Thus, the estimates are cumulative within the calendar
year (i.e., moving from left to right on the gure), since they each represent changes in credit
line activity since the previous year end.
The solid line in Panel A presents the point estimate for the current year'sAbnormal Snow,
and the short dashed lines present the 95% condence intervals on this estimate. Panel B
presents corresponding estimates using the following (instead of the current) year'sAbnormal Snow.
Since the following year's Abnormal Snow has yet to occur at the time the credit line ac-
tivity is measured, Panel B is a placebo test under our identifying assumption that bank
borrowers do not anticipate impending Abnormal Snow.
Panel A of Figure 2 shows that the eect of abnormal rst quarter snow on credit line
draws is concentrated in the rst and second second calendar quarters. This nding indicates
that rms respond to bad weather between January 1 and March 31 by drawing on their
credit line at some point between January 1 and June 30th. The majority of the eect occurs
between the end of the rst and second quarters. Because the points on the line estimate
cumulative credit line draws since the end of the previous year, the attening of the line after
quarter 2 suggests that credit line draws in the second half of the year are unrelated to rst
quarter abnormal snow cover. In addition, the small magnitude and statistical insignicance
of the relation between current year's credit line draws and future abnormal snow cover sug-
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gested in Panel B further bolsters our identifying assumption that borrowers do not adjust
their corporate policies in anticipation of future adverse weather shocks.
Figure 3 conducts a similar analysis using cumulative changes in credit line size as the
outcome of interest. The results here are qualitatively similar to those in Figure 2, except
that line size adjustments occur with a slightly longer lag as they are concentrated almost
exclusively in the second quarter. The point estimates in Figure 3 are approximately twice
as large, but statistically similar to those in Figure 2. Again, Panel B indicates no evidence
that line size changes in the second half of the current year or any point in the previous year
are related to rst quarter abnormal snow.
Taken together, the evidence in Figures 2 and 3 are consistent with banks providing
liquidity to rms experiencing exogenous cash ow shocks. Firms draw on their credit line
during the quarter of and following the shock, and then work with their bank to increase
credit line size within approximately three months of the shock.
V. Eect on Loan Contract Terms
The likely mechanism through which borrowers' credit line limits increase in response to
weather-induced cash ow shocks is loan renegotiation between the borrower and the lender.
Renegotiation in this case could either be initiated by borrowers or forced by lenders as a
result of nancial covenant violations. Given the line size increase we observe, it is likely that
a large portion of the weather-induced renegotiations in our sample are borrower initiated.18
Although a lack of data on loan covenants precludes a direct examination of the type of loan
renegotiations in our sample, our data allow us to examine how weather-induced cash ow
shocks shape the loan contract along other key dimensions.
If managing non-fundamental cash ow shocks is an economically important use of credit
18For example, Roberts and Su (2009) provide descriptive evidence that only approximately 3% to 4%
of renegotiations that lead to loan amount increases experience covenant violations in the previous or the
current year.
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lines, then banks are likely to charge borrowers for this service. The most direct way that
banks charge borrowers is via interest rate increases during the renegotiation process, however
banks may also indirectly charge borrowers by adjusting other loan terms (e.g., keeping
interest rates constant, but shorten the maturity of the loan). We investigate these empirical
questions by examining the relation between weather-induced cash ow shocks and a variety
of loan contract terms.
We begin by examining the relation between cash ows and interest rates charged both
on credit lines and on all loans to a given borrower. Investigating all loans gives a more
complete picture of how the cost of credit changes as the borrower and lender are likely
to simultaneously renegotiate all credit facilities. In Panel A of Table IX the dependent
variable is the change in the (value weighted) average interest rate a borrower pays on their
credit lines over the course of the year. Column 1 of Table IX presents 2SLS estimates
for the relation between weather-induced cash ows and interest rate changes. We nd
that weather-induced cash ow changes have a signicant negative relation with the interest
rates charged on bank lines of credit. The coecient estimate of -0.051 suggests that when
cash ow falls by 1% of a rm's beginning of period total assets, interest rates increase by
approximately 5 basis points. Thus, banks appear to charge borrowers for the liquidity they
use to buer cash ow shocks, even when those shocks are orthogonal to rm fundamentals.
This eect is approximately 2 basis points in column 2 when we expand the sample to all
loans of a given borrower. This implies the pricing eect of exogenous cash ow shocks is
essentially zero within non-credit line bank loans.
A limitation to our data is that we do not observe the interest on undrawn lines of
credit. Thus, our sample of borrower-years with reported nancial information includes only
40,959 borrower-years (i.e., those that have drawn credit lines at the end of both the current
and previous year). Expanding the sample to include borrower-years without complete
nancial statement information more than doubles the observations to 91,529 borrower-
years. Columns 3 and 4 qualitatively support the idea that banks charge for the liquidity
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they provide to rms in response to weather-induced cash ow shocks using our reduced form
approach and the larger sample. We nd a signicant positive relation between interest rate
changes and Abnormal Snow in Column 3, which includes county and industry x year-
quarter xed eects. Column 4 shows that this relation persists, and is approximately 50%
larger, after the inclusion of rm xed eects. Columns 5 and 6 show that these results are
very similar when we expand the sample to all the loans of a given borrower.
There are also a variety of non-price loan terms that banks may adjust in response to
weather-induced cash ow shocks. Our data allow us to analyze some, but not all, of these
potential adjustments. To maximize sample size, in the remainder of the analysis we examine
changes in the average contract terms of all the loans of a given borrower.19 Specically,
in Panels A through C of Table X we examine the loan maturity, the probability of a xed
(as opposed to variable) interest rate contract, and the probability that a loan is secured by
accounts receivable or inventory.
Panels A through C of Table X suggest that weather-induced cash ow shocks lead to less
borrower-friendly non-price loan terms. Column 1 presents 2SLS estimates indicating that
when weather negatively impacts cash ow, loans become shorter in maturity, less likely
to have xed interest rates, and are more likely to be secured by accounts receivable or
inventory. Columns 2 and 3 corroborate these results using our reduced form approach, with
and without rm xed eects. All coecients are statistically signicant at the 5% level or
better, although the standard errors do consistently increase after the inclusion of rm xed
eects.
The evidence in this section suggests that banks charge borrowers for the liquidity they
provide in response to non-fundamental cash ow shocks. They charge borrowers through a
combination of higher interest rates and less favorable non-price loan terms. The fact that
borrowers are willing to pay along these dimensions supports the idea that an important role
19Unreported tests show that results are very similar if we consider the contract terms of only the lines
of credit of a given borrower.
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of credit lines is to help rms manage non-fundamental liquidity shocks.
VI. Heterogeneity
In our nal set of tests we examine whether certain types of rms are more or less likely
to use credit lines to manage weather-induced cash ow shocks. These tests should be in-
terpreted descriptively as they entail endogenous partitions of the data. Moreover, these
partitions weaken the statistical signicance of our IV.20 Accordingly, we focus primarily on
our reduced-form analyses.
We begin by partitioning our sample based on rm size. Specically, in Panel A of Table
XI we partition the sample based on whether the borrower has over $100 million in total
assets. We treat rms that do not report total assets as having less than $100 million in
total assets, however results are qualitatively similar excluding those rms from the anal-
ysis.21 The results suggest that small rms rely more heavily on credit lines to manage
weather-induced cash ow shocks.22 There is a statistically signicant positive relation be-
tween Abnormal Snow and both credit line draws (Columns 1 and 2) and changes in credit
line size (Columns 5 and 6) among the 80% of rms with less than $100 million in total as-
sets. We nd no signicant relation between Abnormal Snow and either credit line outcome
for rms with over $100 million in total assets. Moreover, the coecients in Columns 3 and
4 suggest that this does not appear to be due to a lack of statistical power as the coecients
are not only statistically insignicant, but also smaller in magnitude.
20In most specications Abnormal Snow still signicantly negatively predicts annual cash ows, but its
t-statistic is often below traditional weak instrument thresholds.
21Results are also qualitatively similar partitioning on $50 million or $75 million in total assets or $100
million in sales.
22More broadly, these ndings suggest that credit lines play a rst-order role in helping small rms manage
any non-fundamental variability in corporate cash ows. This relates to the broader literature examining
the eects of non-fundamental cash ow shocks on larger public rms (e.g., Rauh (2006), Bakke and Whited
(2012), Dambra (2017), Blouin and Krull (2009), Faulkender and Petersen (2012)).
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These ndings suggest that the use of credit lines to buer weather-induced cash ow
shocks is most common among small borrowers. In Appendix Table AVI we replicate the
results from Panel A of Table XI with change in cash holdings as the dependent variable.
Within the subsample of large rms, there is a negative and statistically signicant associa-
tion between Abnormal Snow and changes in cash. This evidence is consistent with larger
rms using cash, as opposed to credit lines, as a solution to weather-induced cash ow shocks.
Appendix Table AVII corroborates the tenor of this result using our 2SLS procedure. Small
rms make approximately dollar for dollar draws and adjustments on their credit lines in
response to cash ow shocks, and do not signicantly adjust their cash balances. In contrast,
large rms manage approximately 38% of the cash ow shock by adjusting year-end cash
balances, but do not signicantly adjust their credit lines. These ndings raise the possibility
that larger rms manage parts of non-fundamental cash ow shocks in ways that we do not
observe in the data such as reduced equity payouts, increased equity issuances, or nancial
hedges. An important consideration when interpreting these results is that there are multi-
ple reasons why small rms may exhibit an increased propensity to manage weather-induced
cash ow shocks with credit lines, including lower diversication across geography and indus-
try and more diculty accessing capital markets to issue new equity or use nancial hedges.
Panel B of Table XI shows that the use of credit lines to manage weather-induced cash
ows shocks is also concentrated in rms with close proximity to their lenders. Specically,
we nd no evidence that rms in our sample that are headquartered more than 100 miles
away from the nearest syndicated lending oce of their lead bank use credit lines to buer
weather-induced cash ow shocks. However, this result should not be interpreted causally
because, in addition to being correlated with a variety of observable rm characteristics, a
borrower's choice to be geographically close to their lender may be related to credit line use.
Finally, in Panel C we partition the sample on the borrower's credit quality. We nd
that the use of credit lines to manage non-fundamental cash ow shocks is concentrated
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in the approximately 82% of borrower-years with credit ratings of BB or higher.23 For
instance, Column 1 shows that the estimated relation between credit line drawdowns and
Abnormal Snow is 0.032 among the 153,667 borrower-years rated BB or better and 0.007
among the 34,133 borrower-years rated B or worse.24 The remaining columns paint a similar
picture. These ndings suggest that the lowest credit quality borrowers are not able to use
credit lines to manage exogenous liquidity shocks. This result is consistent with theory. For
example, Diamond (1991) argues that low- and medium-credit risk borrowers can rely on
bank nancing for liquidity, but high credit risk borrowers may not be able to do so, even
when facing non-fundamental liquidity shocks.
VII. Concluding Remarks
This study uses a unique dataset on bank lending portfolios to study how rms manage
liquidity in the face of non-fundamental cash ow shocks. Starting in 2012, the Federal
Reserve has collected comprehensive data on bank lending activities as part of the Dodd-
Frank Stress Tests and Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review. The resulting data
(the Federal Reserve Y-14 collection) contains a rich dataset on bank loans to small, mid-
sized, and large companies in the United States. Notably, the FR Y-14 Collection has broad
coverage of loan terms and nancial statements of the small private rms that rely extensively
on external credit, but typically do not appear in publicly available databases.
We show that these rms rely extensively on credit lines as a source of external nance.
To identify a causal link between cash ow shocks and corporate liquidity management, we
23As a sanity check, in unreported tests we nd that within the 2SLS sample low credit quality borrowers
(as dened by the internal bank rating) have future probabilities of default of greater than 6.4% (as estimated
by the lender) as compared to high credit quality borrowers that have a probability of default of only 0.7%.
Within the full reduced form sample low credit quality borrowers have a probability of default of 5.4% versus
1.1% probability of default of high credit quality borrowers.
24In unreported tests we verify that the average weather shocks are nearly identical in size between the
two subsamples. Additionally, the t-stat for dierences in means indicates a lack of statistical dierence.
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construct an instrument for cash ow based on abnormal adverse winter weather conditions
in the county in which the company is located. Using this instrument to predict rm-level
cash ows, we nd that rms manage negative cash ow shocks primarily by drawing on their
credit lines rather than tapping cash reserves or adjusting real activities. Negative cash ow
shocks are also accompanied by signicant increases in the size of the rm's overall credit line,
indicating that banks accommodate borrowers faced with unexpected cash ow shortfalls.
These credit line adjustments occur within one calendar quarter and persist through the end
of the year. Additional tests show that banks charge borrowers for this liquidity provision
via increased interest rates and less borrower-friendly loan provisions. Specically, we nd
that weather-induced cash ow shocks lead to higher interest rates, shorter loan maturity,
and an increased probability of the loan being secured or having a variable interest rate.
One important qualication is that our results are driven by small rms and cannot be
extrapolated to the large public (e.g., COMPUSTAT) rms that researchers often study.
Whereas larger rms tend to rely more on cash holdings to manage liquidity, the main
takeaway from our work is that one important function of bank credit lines is to buer
liquidity shocks experienced by smaller solvent rms.
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Figure 1: Distribution of Abnormal Snow Cover. This gure presents the distribution of
abnormal snow cover during the rst calendar quarter for the 102,742 rm-years in our 2SLS sample.
The distribution in Panel A is constructed based on the average daily snow cover during the rst
calendar quarter, while Panel B uses the 95th percentile of snow cover during the rst calendar
quarter. Abnormal snow cover is dened relative to the time-series average of rst calendar quarter
snow cover in each county over the previous 10 years.
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End of calendar quarter
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(b) Line Draw and Next Year's Abnormal Snow
Figure 2: Quarterly Credit Line Draw and Abnormal Snow. This gure presents the
relation between the current (Panel A) and future (Panel B) year's Abormal Snow and quarterly
credit line draw activity. The gure is estimated from four regressions, one for each calendar quarter.
The point estimates (i.e., the solid line) reect the cumulative eect of Abormal Snow on credit line
drawdowns from the end of the previous year until the end of the calendar quarter denoted on the x-
axis. Specically, each regression regresses changes in credit line activity between December 31 of the
previous year and the end of the calendar quarter denoted on the x-axis on Abormal Snow in both
the current and the following year. The solid line presents the point estimates for Abormal Snow
in the current year (Panel A) and in the following year (Panel B). The short dashed lines present
the 95 percent condence intervals on this estimate.
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Effect of future Abnormal Snow on line size since prior Dec. 31
95% confidence interval
(b) Line Size and Next Year's Abnormal Snow
Figure 3: Quarterly Credit Line Size and Abnormal Snow. This gure presents the relation
between the current (Panel A) and future (Panel B) year's Abormal Snow and quarterly credit line
size changes. The gure is estimated from four regressions, one for each calendar quarter. The
point estimates (i.e., the solid line) reect the cumulative eect of Abormal Snow on credit line
drawdowns from the end of the previous year until the end of the calendar quarter denoted on the x-
axis. Specically, each regression regresses changes in credit line activity between December 31 of the
previous year and the end of the calendar quarter denoted on the x-axis on Abormal Snow in both
the current and the following year. The solid line presents the point estimates for Abormal Snow
in the current year (Panel A) and in the following year (Panel B). The short dashed lines present
the 95 percent condence intervals on this estimate.
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Table I: Descriptive Statistics. This table presents descriptive statistics for our sample of
102,742 rm-years with available borrower and loan characteristics. All variables with the exception
of Total Assets are scaled by rm total assets as of the previous year. Columns 1 and 2 present
the mean and standard deviation, while Columns 3 through 5 present the 25th, 50th, and 75th
percentiles, respectively. The Line Size statistics use a smaller sample of the 64,983 rm-years
with available credit lines. All explanatory variables are dened in Appendix B.
Mean SD P25 P50 P75
Total Assets ($ Millions) 706.92 3021.84 7.98 21.34 92.64
Cash F low 0.16 0.21 0.06 0.12 0.20
Leverage 0.61 0.21 0.47 0.63 0.77
Fixed Assets 0.29 0.27 0.06 0.20 0.45
Sales 2.31 1.94 1.06 1.96 3.03
Cash 0.10 0.13 0.01 0.05 0.14
Debt 0.32 0.24 0.12 0.29 0.48
WorkCap 0.10 0.21 −0.03 0.07 0.22
Line Size 0.24 0.19 0.09 0.20 0.35
∆ Line Size 0.03 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.01
Draw 0.09 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.12
∆ Drawn 0.02 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.01
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Table II: Cash Flow and Abnormal Weather. This table contains estimated coecients from
an OLS regression of Cash F lowit on Abnormal Snow (columns 1 and 2) and Abnormal Snow P95
(columns 3 and 4). All columns include four-digit NAICS industry x year-quarter xed eects and
county xed eects. The standard errors are clustered at the four-digit NAICS 2012 industry level.
All variables are dened in Appendix B.
Cash F lowit
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Abn. Snow −0.029*** −0.028***
(0.006) (0.006)
















Industry x Year-quarter FEs YES YES YES YES
County Fixed Eects YES YES YES YES
Adjusted R-Squared 0.139 0.235 0.139 0.235
Observations 102,742 102,742 102,742 102,742
Standard errors in parentheses
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
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Table III: Cash Flow and Abnormal Weather: Industry Partitions This table contains
estimated coecients from an OLS regression of Cash F lowit on Abnormal Snow. Each row in
the table restricts the sample to the sector indicated in Column 1. Columns 2 and 3 present the
estimates (and standard errors below in parentheses) for the coecients on Abnormal Snow and
Abnormal Snow P95, respectively. We include identical controls to those in Specication (2) of
Table II (dened in Appendix B), as well as state and year xed eects. The standard errors are
adjusted for heteroskedasticity. Borrower industry is dened in terms of the 2-digit NAICS code
corresponding to each borrower. Borrowers with 2-digit NAICS codes of 31, 32, and 33 are classied
as Manufacturing; 42 is classied as Wholesale Trade; 44 and 45 as Retail Trade; 48 and 49 as
Transportation; 53 as Real Estate; 54, 55, and 56 as Business Services; 61 and 62 as Education
& Health; 23 as Construction'.
All unreported industries comprise less than 4% of our sample, observations total 103,265.
Ab. Snow Ab. Snow P95 % Obs Obs
(SE) (SE)
MANUFACTURING −0.027** −0.012 23.6% 24,370
(0.013) (0.008)
WHOLESALE −0.015 −0.014** 17.4% 17,927
(0.012) (0.007)
RETAIL −0.022* −0.015* 14.1% 14,509
(0.013) (0.008)
BUSINESS SERV ICES −0.053 −0.016 9.5% 9,778
(0.037) (0.022)
REAL ESTATE −0.082*** −0.056*** 7.5% 7,729
(0.026) (0.015)
CONSTRUCTION −0.041** −0.020** 7.1% 7,320
(0.018) (0.010)
EDUCATION & HEALTH −0.036 −0.010 4.6% 4,733
(0.074) (0.043)
TRANSPORTATION −0.059* −0.037** 4.1% 4,217
(0.032) (0.018)
Standard errors in parentheses
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
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Table IV: Descriptive Statistics, Partitioned by Weather Shock. This table presents de-
scriptive statistics for our sample of 102,742 observations with available borrower and loan char-
acteristics. The sample is partitioned by Abnormal Snow tercile, with sample sizes ranging from
33,854 (tercile 1) to 34,908 (tercile 3). Columns 1 and 2 present the mean and median for the rst
tercile of Abnormal Snow, while Columns 3 and 4 (5 and 6) do the same for the second (third)
tercile. Column 7 presents the dierence between the averages in the rst and third terclie using
linear regressions. The regressions include county and industry-year-quarter xed eects and the
standard errors are clustered at the 4 digit NAICS code level. *, **, *** represent signicant dier-
ences at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels after absorbing county and industry-year-quarter variation and
clustering at the 4-digit NAICS industry level. All explanatory variables are dened in Appendix
B.
Ave(T1) P50(T1) Ave(T2) P50(T2) Ave(T3) P50(T3) T3-T1
Total Assets 711.66 21.70 760.43 22.36 650.24 20.24 0.03
Cash F low 0.16 0.12 0.16 0.12 0.16 0.12 0.00
Leverage 0.61 0.63 0.61 0.63 0.61 0.63 0.00
Fixed Assets 0.28 0.19 0.32 0.23 0.28 0.19 0.00
Sales 2.34 1.98 2.25 1.89 2.35 2.00 −0.04**
Cash 0.10 0.05 0.10 0.05 0.10 0.05 0.00
Debt 0.31 0.28 0.34 0.31 0.32 0.28 0.003*
WorkCap 0.10 0.08 0.09 0.06 0.10 0.08 0.00
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Table V: Credit Line Use In Panel A Column 1 presents OLS estimates from a regression
of ∆Drawit on Cash F lowit. Columns 2 through 4 present 2SLS estimates of IV regressions of
∆Drawit on instrumented Cash F lowit. Columns 2 and 3 use Abnormal Snow as an instrumental
variable, while Column 4 uses Abnormal Snow P95. All columns include county and four-digit
NAICS x year-quarter xed eects. Panel B presents OLS regressions that regress ∆Drawit directly
on Abnormal Snow. Since these tests do not all require nancial data, in Panel B we scale ∆Drawit
by the beginning of period total loan commitment. Columns 1 through 3 use a sample that requires
the same nancial statement information as in Panel A. Columns 1 and 2 dier only in that Column
2 includes rm instead of county xed eects. Columns 1 and 3 dier in that Column 3 adds rm-
level control variables. Columns 4 and 5 expand the sample to all borrower-years for which we have
bank loan information. Column 5 diers from Column 4 in that it includes rm instead of county
xed eects, instead of county xed eects. All columns include four-digit NAICS industry x year-
quarter xed eects and use standard errors that are clustered at the four-digit NAICS industry
level. All variables are dened in Appendix B.
Panel A: OLS and 2SLS
∆Drawit
OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cash F lowit −0.0000 −0.407** −0.425** −0.524**
(0.0028) (0.173) (0.189) (0.259)
Log(Assets)it−1 −0.0022*** −0.003*** −0.004***
(0.0006) (0.001) (0.001)
Fixed Assetsit−1 −0.0132*** 0.026 0.035
(0.0035) (0.017) (0.023)
Leverageit−1 0.0023 −0.031* −0.039
(0.0030) (0.016) (0.024)
Salesit−1 0.0018*** 0.016** 0.020**
(0.0005) (0.006) (0.009)
Cashit−1 −0.0231*** 0.072 0.093
(0.0049) (0.042) (0.060)
Debtit−1 0.0084 0.010 0.010
(0.0059) (0.006) (0.009)
WorkCapit−1 −0.0033 0.007 0.009
(0.0023) (0.005) (0.006)
Industry x Year-quarter FEs YES YES YES YES
County FE YES YES YES YES
R-Squared 0.115 . . .
Observations 102,742 102,742 102,742 102,742
Standard errors in parentheses
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
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Panel B: Reduced Form
∆Drawit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Abn. Snowit 0.031** 0.032 0.032** 0.027*** 0.027*















Industry x Year-quarter FEs YES YES YES YES YES
County FE YES NO YES YES NO
Firm FE NO YES NO NO YES
R-Squared 0.105 0.374 0.107 0.091 0.310
Observations 100,424 75,876 100,424 189,312 164,603
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Table VI: Credit Line Size Column 1 presents OLS estimates from regressions of ∆Line Sizeit on
Cash F lowit. Column 2 presents 2SLS estimates of IV regressions of ∆Line Sizeit on instrumented
Cash F lowit, using Abnormal Snow as an instrumental variable. Columns 3 and 4 present OLS
regressions that regress ∆Line Sizeit directly on Abnormal Snow. Since these tests do not all
require nancial data, we scale ∆Line Sizeit by the beginning of period total loan commitments.
Here, we expand the sample to all borrower-years for which we have bank loan information. Column
4 diers from Columns 1 through 3 in that it includes rm xed eects, instead of county xed eects.
All columns include four-digit NAICS industry x year-quarter xed eects and use standard errors
that are clustered at the four-digit NAICS industry level. All variables are dened in Appendix B.
∆Line Sizeit
OLS 2SLS Red.Form Red.Form
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cash F lowit 0.0195*** −0.526**
(0.0050) (0.246)
















Industry x Year-quarter FEs YES YES YES YES
County FE YES YES YES NO
Firm FE NO NO NO YES
R-Squared 0.151 . 0.144 0.378
Observations 102,742 102,742 189,312 164,603
Standard errors in parentheses
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
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Table VII: Credit Line Slack This table partitions our reduced-form analysis on pre-existing
credit line slack. Specically, we partitions the sample on whether the borrower's beginning period
credit line slack (=unused credit line commitments to total credit line commitments) is greater
than the 25th percentile of the respective distribution. Columns 1 and 2 (3 and 4) regress ∆Drawit
(∆Line Sizeit) on Abnormal Snow. All columns include four-digit NAICS x year-quarter xed
eects. Panel A also includes county xed eects, while Panel B includes rm xed eects. The
standard errors are clustered at the four-digit NAICS 2012 industry level. All variables are dened
in Appendix B.
Panel A: County Fixed Eects
∆Drawn ∆Line Size
Low Slack Slack Low Slack Slack
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Abn. Snow 0.0594*** 0.0084 0.1007*** −0.0008
(0.0180) (0.0100) (0.0279) (0.0182)
Observations 32,489 100,139 32,489 100,139
R-Squared 0.1855 0.0829 0.2549 0.0845
Industry x Year-qtr FE YES YES YES YES
County FE YES YES YES YES
Panel B: Firm Fixed Eects
∆Drawn ∆Line Size
Low Slack Slack Low Slack Slack
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Abn. Snow 0.0542* 0.0152 0.0918*** 0.0027
(0.0275) (0.0167) (0.0336) (0.0240)
Observations 22,319 83,941 22,319 83,941
R-Squared 0.4727 0.3414 0.5588 0.3862
Industry x Year-qtr FE YES YES YES YES
Firm FE YES YES YES YES
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Table VIII: Other Liquidity Management Tools This table presents 2SLS estimates of
IV regressions of ∆Cashit, ∆FixedAssetsit, ∆TradeCredit, and ∆TotalDebtit on instrumented
Cash F lowit and controls. We instrument for Cash F lowit with Abnormal Snow (using Column
2 of Table 2 as our rst stage). All columns include four-digit NAICS x year-quarter and county
xed eects. The standard errors are clustered at the four-digit NAICS 2012 industry level. All
variables are dened in Appendix B.
∆Cashit ∆FixedAssetsit ∆TradeCredit ∆Total Debtit
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cash F lowit 0.181 0.059 0.012 −0.354*
(0.119) (0.168) (0.098) (0.203)
Log(Assets)it−1 −0.0005 0.001 −0.0006** −0.0005
(0.0004) (0.001) (0.0003) (0.0008)
Fixed Assetsit−1 −0.015 −0.017 −0.005 0.028
(0.012) (0.015) (0.009) (0.021)
Leverageit−1 −0.001 −0.019 0.003 −0.006
(0.010) (0.016) (0.008) (0.019)
Salesit−1 −0.004 −0.0005 −0.002 0.014**
(0.004) (0.006) (0.003) (0.007)
Cashit−1 −0.131*** −0.024 0.006 0.021
(0.027) (0.036) (0.023) (0.046)
Debtit−1 −0.017** −0.003 −0.004* −0.105***
(0.008) (0.003) (0.002) (0.018)
WorkCapit−1 0.005 −0.019*** −0.009*** −0.013*
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.007)
Industry x Year-qtr FE YES YES YES YES
County FE YES YES YES YES
Observations 102,742 102,742 102,679 102,742
Standard errors in parentheses
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
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Table IX: Loan Interest Rates The dependent variables are ∆Line Interest Rateit (Columns
1, 3, and 4) and ∆Interest Rateit (Columns 2, 5, and 6). Columns 1 and 2 present second-stage
2SLS estimates in which cash ows are instrumented for with Abnormal Snow. Columns 3 through
6 regress the dependent variables directly on Abnormal Snow. Columns 1 and 2 include the same
set of control variables as in column (3) of Table 5 Panel A. All columns include four-digit NAICS x
year-quarter xed eects. Columns 1, 2, 3, and 5 also include county xed eects, while Columns 4
and 6 include rm xed eects. The standard errors are clustered at the four-digit NAICS industry
level. All variables are dened in Appendix B.
∆Line Rt ∆Rate ∆Line Rate ∆Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cash F lowit −0.051* −0.024**
(0.026) (0.012)
Abn. Snow 0.0008** 0.0012*** 0.0005** 0.0006*
(0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0003)
Firm Controls YES YES NO NO NO NO
Ind.-Year-Qtr. YES YES YES YES YES YES
County FE YES YES YES NO YES NO
Firm FE NO NO NO YES NO YES
R-Squared 0.143 0.383 0.091 0.342
Observations 40,959 78,601 91,529 77,442 149,648 126,586
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Table X: Non-Price Loan Provisions The dependent variables are (in Panel A) ∆Maturityit,
(in Panel B) ∆FixedRateit, and (in Panel C) ∆Securedit. Column 1 of each panel presents second-
stage 2SLS estimates where cash ows are instrumented for with Abnormal Snow. Columns 2 and
3 regress the dependent variable directly on Abnormal Snow. Column 1 includes the same set of
control variables as in column (3) of Table 5 Panel A. All columns include four-digit NAICS x year-
quarter xed eects. Columns 1 and 2 also include county xed eects, while Column 3 includes
rm xed eects. The standard errors are clustered at the four-digit NAICS industry level.




Cash F lowit 29.25***
(10.31)
Abn. Snow −0.740*** −0.894***
(0.183) (0.263)
Firm Controls YES NO NO
Industry x Year-quarter FEs YES YES YES
County FE YES YES NO
Firm FE NO NO YES
R-Squared . 0.084 0.276
Observations 100,422 189,310 164,603




Cash F lowit 1.150***
(0.374)
Abn. Snow −0.019*** −0.022***
(0.005) (0.006)
Firm Controls YES NO NO
Industry x Year-quarter FEs YES YES YES
County FE YES YES NO
Firm FE NO NO YES
R-Squared . 0.067 0.321
Observations 100,422 189,310 164,603
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Cash F lowit −3.728***
(1.306)
Abn. Snow 0.120*** 0.124***
(0.020) (0.030)
Firm Controls YES NO NO
Industry x Year-quarter FEs YES YES YES
County FE YES YES NO
Firm FE NO NO YES
R-Squared . 0.216 0.380
Observations 100,422 189,310 164,603
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Table XI: Examination of Heterogeneity in Main Results This table partitions our reduced-
form analysis on borrower total assets (Panel A), distance-to-lender (Panel B), and the loans rating
(Panel C). In Panel A, large rms are those with over $100 million in total assets, while small rms
are those with less than $100 million in total assets or unreported total assets. In Panel B, rms
are considered near to (far from) their lender if the average distance between the borrower and
the syndicated lending oce of their lead managers is less than (more than) 100 miles. Panel C
partitions the sample on whether the loan is rated BB or better according the lender's internal credit
rating.Columns 1 through 4 (5 though 8) regress ∆Drawit (∆Line Sizeit) on Abnormal Snow. All
columns include four-digit NAICS x year-quarter xed eects. Odd (even) numbered columns also
include county (rm) xed eects. The standard errors are clustered at the four-digit NAICS 2012
industry level. All variables are dened in Appendix B.
Panel A: Borrower Total Assets Partition
∆Drawit ∆Line Sizeit
Small Large Small Large
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Abn. Snow 0.035*** 0.041** 0.007 −0.021 0.083*** 0.083*** 0.063 0.049
(0.009) (0.019) (0.023) (0.033) (0.014) (0.024) (0.044) (0.062)
Ind.-Year-Qtr. YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
County FE YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO
Firm FE NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES
R-Squared 0.102 0.322 0.130 0.359 0.165 0.400 0.166 0.404
Observations 149,326 126,829 38,829 33,717 149,326 126,829 38,829 33,717
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Panel B: Distance-to-lender Partition
∆Drawit ∆Line Sizeit
Near Far Near Far
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Abn. Snow 0.119*** 0.078** −0.003 −0.004 0.301*** 0.186** 0.004 0.018
(0.024) (0.036) (0.013) (0.017) (0.059) (0.084) (0.022) (0.025)
Ind.-Year-Qtr. YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
County FE YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO
Firm FE NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES
R-Squared 0.123 0.343 0.115 0.328 0.152 0.394 0.179 0.411
Observations 54,012 46,522 99,536 87,024 54,012 46,522 99,536 87,024
Panel C: Loan Rating Partition
∆Drawit ∆Line Sizeit
BBorBetter BorWorse BBorBetter BorWorse
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Abn. Snow 0.032*** 0.025 0.007 −0.042 0.084*** 0.084*** 0.004 −0.059
(0.010) (0.017) (0.020) (0.041) (0.014) (0.020) (0.035) (0.067)
Ind.-Year-Qtr. YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
County FE YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO
Firm FE NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES
R-Squared 0.101 0.337 0.148 0.427 0.161 0.409 0.174 0.473
Observations 153,667 129,746 34,133 21,360 153,667 129,746 34,133 21,360
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Appendix A - Data Cleaning
We rst clean data errors in the nancial statement information in the loan-quarter panel.
To minimize the eect of errors we exclude nancial statement information if the nancial
statement date is missing or comes later than the data report date. We also exclude likely
data errors by requiring that for each rm and nancial statement date: 1) EBITDA does
not exceed net sales, 2) xed assets do exceed total assets, 3) cash and marketable securities
do not exceed total assets, 4) long-term debt does not exceed total liabilities, 5) short-term
debt does not exceed total liabilities, 6) tangible assets do not exceed total assets, 7) current
assets do not exceed total assets, 8) current liabilities do not exceed total liabilities.
Next, to address the possibility that some large corporations are borrowing through their
subsidiaries, for each borrower and nancial statement date we only keep the nancial state-
ment information corresponding to the observation with the largest value of total assets.
Given that the nancials and physical location information we observe always correspond
to the entity that is directly responsible for loan repayment, in the case of large rms the
nancial statement information could be that of a subsidiary instead of the ultimate parent
company. For example, to the extent that for a given borrower-quarter one nancial insti-
tution reports the nancials of a corresponding subsidiary while another institution reports
nancials associated with the parent entity, then we will retain the nancials of the parent
entity. If, however, certain companies only borrow through their subsidiaries, we may un-
derstate the size of some rms in our sample.
Last, we correct errors related to the dollar units of reporting. In some cases the -
nancial statement information may be reported in thousands of US dollars instead of raw
dollar amounts as instructed. To address this potential reporting irregularity, we multiply
all nancial statement information by 1,000 if either the utilized loan exposure in a given
reporting quarter exceeds total liabilities by a factor of 100 or more, or if total assets are less
than $100,000. Given that the reporting criteria only includes loans larger than $1 million,
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it is highly unlikely that the borrower has total assets below $100,000.
Additionally, given that we rely on the time series aspect of the data, we require that
currently-reported borrower total assets for the prior year are within 1% of the 1-year lagged
value of currently-reported borrower total assets. This lter eliminates observations in which
the Y-14 reporters switch reporting of nancial statement information between subsidiaries
and the parent company of the borrower.
Given our controls rely on both currently-reported lags of some of the nancial variables
as well as lags that we construct from the data, before we arrive at the nal data set we also
drop observations in which: 1) lagged operating income exceeds lagged sales, 2) lagged xed
assets exceeds lagged total assets, 3) lagged current liabilities exceeds lagged total assets, 4)
lagged total liabilities do not exceed lagged total assets, 5) the lagged values of total liabili-
ties are greater than or equal to zero. We also require that (6) the current and lagged values
of the size of lines of credit do not exceed total assets, (7) the current and lagged values of
the size of lines of credit do not exceed the corresponding values for total liabilities.25
25The nal three lters, 5-7, do not materially aect our results, but we believe enhance the quality of
data used in our estimation. Filter 7, the most inuential of these lters requires that line size does not
exceed total liabilities. Removing this lter leads to larger estimates of our main results and a sample that
is approximately 20% larger. We apply this lter to be conservative as we do not want these borrowers
with unusually large reported credit lines, which may correspond to data errors with respect to either the
reported line size or reported liabilities, to skew our results.
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Appendix B - Variable Denitions
Below we present variable denitions, the item numbers of data elds refer to Schedule
H1 of the Y-14Q data on the Federal Reserve's website:
https : //www.federalreserve.gov/reportforms/forms/FR_Y − 14Q20160930_i.pdf
Total Assetsit−1  is dened as the rst annual lag of the book value of total assets as
of the current nancial statement date, `Total Assets Current Year' (item #70) data eld in
Y-14Q Schedule H1. To the extent that `Total Assets Current Year' is missing, we replace
it with the book value of total assets as of exactly one year prior to the current nancial
statement date, `Total Assets Prior Year' (item #71).
Cash F lowit  we primarily rely on the sum of `Operating Income' (item #56) and
`Depreciation & Amortization' (item #57) to arrive at a measure of EBITDA. To the extent
that the `Operating Income' eld is not populated in our data, we ll in missing values with
the `EBITDA' eld that is overall available for a smaller fraction of the data. We then scale
the resulting variable by Total Assetsit−1 to arrive at Cash F low.
Salesit−1 is dened as the net sales from time t−2 to t−1, `Net Sales Prior Year' (item
#55) divided by total assets of rm i at time t− 1, Total Assetsit−1.
Leverageit−1 is dened as the rst annual lag of the value of total liabilities of rm
i, `Total Liabilities' (item #80), divided by total assets of rm i also as of time t − 1,
Total Assetsit−1.
Fixed Assetsit−1 is dened as the rst annual lag of the value of total xed assets
of rm i, `Fixed Assets' (item #69), divided by total assets of rm i also as of time t − 1,
Total Assetsit−1.
WorkCapit−1 is dened as the rst annual lag of the value of current assets of rm
i, `Current Assets Current' (item #66), minus the rst annual lag of the value of current
liabilities, `Current Liabilities Current' (item #76)', minus rst annual lag of the value of
cash and marketable securities of rm i, `Cash & Marketable Securities' (item #61). Then
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the resulting value is divided by total assets of rm i also as of time t− 1, Total Assetsit−1.
To the extent that `Current Assets Current' and `Current Liabilities Current' are missing, we
replace it with `Current Assets Prior Year' (item #67) and `Current Liabilities Prior Year'
(item #77) which are the values current assets and current liabilities exactly one year prior
to the current nancial statement date.
Cashit−1 is dened as the rst annual lag of the value of cash and marketable securities
of rm i, `Cash & Marketable Securities' (item #61), divided by total assets of rm i also
as of time t− 1, Total Assetsit−1.
Debtit−1 is dened as the rst annual lag of the value of total debt of rm i, `Short-Term
Debt' (item #74) + `Long-Term Debt' (item #78), divided by total assets of rm i also as
of time t− 1, Total Assetsit−1.
Linesit−1 is dened as the rst annual lag of the total value of credit line commitments
of rm i (`Commitment Exposure Global' (item #24) aggregated for each rm-quarter in
our sample), divided by total assets of rm i also as of time t− 1, Total Assetsit−1.
Drawit−1 is dened as the rst annual lag of the total value of drawn amount under
all credit line commitments of rm i (`Utilized Exposure Global' (item #25) aggregated for
each rm-quarter in our sample), divided by total assets of rm i also as of time t − 1,
Total Assetsit−1.
∆Line Sizeit is dened as the annual change of the total value of credit line commit-
ments of rm i (`Commitment Exposure Global' (item #24) aggregated for each rm-quarter
in our sample), divided by total assets of rm i also as of time t− 1, Total Assetsit−1.
Line Increaseit is an indicator variable that takes the value of one whenever the total
credit line commitments of rm i in year t exceed the total credit line commitments of rm
i in year t− 1.
∆Drawit is dened as the annual change of the total value of drawn amount under
all credit line commitments of rm i (`Utilized Exposure Global' (item #25) aggregated for
each rm-quarter in our sample), divided by total assets of rm i also as of time t − 1,
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Total Assetsit−1.
∆Cashit is dened as the annual change of the value of cash and marketable securities
of rm i (`Cash & Marketable Securities' (item #61)), divided by total assets of rm i also
as of time t− 1, Total Assetsit−1.
∆Liabilitiesit is dened as the annual change of the value of total liabilities of rm
i (`Total Liabilities' (item #80)), divided by total assets of rm i also as of time t − 1,
Total Assetsit−1.
∆Debtit is dened as the annual change of the value of total debt of rm i (`Short-Term
Debt' (item #74) + `Long-Term Debt' (item #78)), divided by total assets of rm i also as
of time t− 1, Total Assetsit−1.
∆TradeCredit is dened as the annual change of the value of accounts receivable of
rm i from year t− 1 to year t (`A/R Current' (item #62) − `A/R Prior Year' (item #63))
minus the annual change of accounts payable of rms i from year t − 1 to year t (`A/P
Current' (item #72) − `A/P Prior Year' (item #73)), divided by net sales of rm i from
time t− 2 to t− 1, `Net Sales Prior Year' (item #55).
∆Assetsit is dened as the annual change of the value of total assets of rm i (we use
`Total Assets Current Year' (item #70) to build the current value of total assets), divided
by total assets of rm i also as of time t− 1, Total Assetsit−1.
∆Fixed Assetsit is dened as the annual change of the value of total xed assets of
rm i (`Fixed Assets' (item #69)), divided by total assets of rm i also as of time t − 1,
Total Assetsit−1.
∆WorkCapit is dened as the annual change of the value of non-cash working capital
of rm i (WorkCap) between years t − 1 and t, divided by total assets of rm i also as of
time t− 1, Total Assetsit−1.
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Internet Appendix for Weathering Cash Flow Shocks1
1Brown, James, Matthew Gustafson, and Ivan Ivanov, Internet Appendix to Weathering Cash Flow
Shocks, Journal of Finance [DOI STRING].
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Table AI: Sales and Abnormal Weather: Industry Partitions This table contains estimated
coecients from an OLS regression of Salesit on Abnormal Snow in a model with identical controls
to that in Specications (2) and (4) of Table II. Each row in the table restricts the sample to the
sector indicated in Column 1. Columns 2 and 3 present the estimates (and standard errors below
in parentheses) for the coecients on Abnormal Snow and Abnormal Snow P95, respectively. We
include state and year xed eects. The standard errors are clustered at the four-digit NAICS 2012
industry level. Borrower industry is dened in terms of the 2-digit NAICS code corresponding to each
borrower. Borrowers with 2-digit NAICS codes of 31, 32, and 33 are classied as Manufacturing;
42 is classied as Wholesale Trade; 44 and 45 as Retail Trade; 48 and 49 as Transportation; 53
as Real Estate; 54, 55, and 56 as Business Services; 61 and 62 as Education & Health; 23 as
Construction'. All variables are dened in Appendix B.
All unreported industries comprise less than 4% of our sample totalling 103,261
observations.
Ab. Snow Ab. Snow P95 % Obs Obs
(SE) (SE)
MANUFACTURING 0.021 0.031 23.6% 24,370
(0.040) (0.023)
WHOLESALE −0.091 −0.052 17.4% 17,927
(0.079) (0.041)
RETAIL −0.019 −0.001 14.0% 14,507
(0.069) (0.041)
BUSINESS SERV ICES −0.006 0.068 9.5% 9,778
(0.101) (0.063)
REAL ESTATE −0.044 0.002 7.5% 7,729
(0.085) (0.044)
CONSTRUCTION 0.158 0.107 7.1% 7,320
(0.112) (0.060)
EDUCATION & HEALTH −0.202 −0.129 4.6% 4,733
(0.141) (0.081)
TRANSPORTATION −0.051 −0.083 4.1% 4,217
(0.111) (0.062)
Standard errors in parentheses
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
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Table AII: Autocorrelation of Abnormal Snow The table regresses Abnormal Snow on lagged
Abnormal Snow within a county for county-years in the 2000-2010 time period (immediately prior
the beginning of our sample period). All columns include county xed eects and Columns 1 and
3 also include year xed eects.
Full Sample Full Sample Drop No Snow Drop No Snow
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lagged (Abnormal Snow) −0.017 −0.005 −0.031 −0.018
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Year FEs YES NO YES NO
County FE YES YES YES YES
Observations 31,250 31,250 26,341 26,341
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
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Table AIII: Change in Credit Line Drawn by Industry and Historical Snow This table
contains the average change in drawn amount scaled by total committed bank debt from the previous
year in the three terciles of average weather in the past 10 years. The statistics are partitioned by
industry. Borrowers with 2-digit NAICS codes of 31, 32, and 33 are classied as Manufacturing;
42 is classied as Wholesale Trade; 44 and 45 as Retail Trade; 48 and 49 as Transportation; 53
as Real Estate; 54, 55, and 56 as Business Services; 61 and 62 as Education & Health; 23 as
Construction'.
All unreported industries comprise less than 4% of our sample.
Tercile 1
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
BUSINESS SERV ICES 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02
CONSTRUCTION 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.01
EDUCATION & HEALTH 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01
MANUFACTURING 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.00
REAL ESTATE 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01
RETAIL 0.00 0.03 −0.01 0.07
TRANSPORTATION 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.02
WHOLESALE 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.01
Tercile 2
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
BUSINESS SERV ICES 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.03
CONSTRUCTION 0.01 0.04 0.00 −0.01
EDUCATION & HEALTH −0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02
MANUFACTURING 0.02 0.02 0.00 −0.00
REAL ESTATE 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01
RETAIL 0.02 0.01 −0.02 0.08
TRANSPORTATION 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01
WHOLESALE 0.02 0.03 0.01 −0.00
Tercile 3
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
BUSINESS SERV ICES 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.02
CONSTRUCTION −0.00 0.06 −0.01 −0.01
EDUCATION & HEALTH −0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02
MANUFACTURING 0.02 0.02 0.00 −0.01
REAL ESTATE 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00
RETAIL 0.02 −0.00 −0.02 0.09
TRANSPORTATION 0.01 0.02 −0.00 0.00
WHOLESALE 0.02 0.04 0.00 −0.01
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Table AIV: Credit Line Use: Robustness This table presents second-stage 2SLS results where
the dependent variable is ∆Drawit. Column 1 replicates our 2SLS analysis excluding extreme
abnormal snow events (i.e., those that are 3 standard deviations above or below the mean). Column
2 replicates our 2SLS analysis excluding areas that experience no snow events during our ten year
benchmark period. Column 3 replicates the analysis including rm xed eects. All columns include
the same set of control variables as in column (3) of Table 5, four-digit NAICS x year-quarter xed
eects, and county xed eects. The standard errors are clustered at the four-digit NAICS industry
level. All variables are dened in Appendix B.
∆Drawit
Snow < 3SD Snow > 0 Firm FEs
(1) (2) (3)
Cash F lowit −0.562** −0.448** −0.749
(0.262) (0.189) (0.696)
Firm Controls YES YES YES
Industry x Year-quarter FEs YES YES YES
County FE YES YES NO
Firm FE NO NO YES
Observations 94,061 89,914 77,662
Standard errors in parentheses
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
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Table AV: Credit Line Size: Robustness This table presents second-stage 2SLS results where
the dependent variable is ∆Line Sizeit. Column 1 replicates our 2SLS analysis (Column 2 of Table
V) using Abnormal Snow P95 as an IV for annual cash ows. Column 2 replicates our 2SLS
analysis excluding extreme abnormal snow events (i.e., those that are 3 standard deviations above
or below the mean). Column 3 replicates our 2SLS analysis excluding areas that experience no
snow events during our ten year benchmark period. Column 4 replicates our 2SLS results excluding
the rm-level control variables, while Column 5 replicates the analysis including rm xed eects.
All columns include four-digit NAICS x year-quarter xed eects, and county xed eects. The
standard errors are clustered at the four-digit NAICS industry level. All variables are dened in
Appendix B.
∆Line Sizeit
P95 IV Snow < 3SD Snow > 0 No Controls Firm FEs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Cash F lowit −0.841** −0.701** −0.572** −0.495** −0.869
(0.384) (0.308) (0.244) (0.224) (1.081)
Firm Controls YES YES YES NO YES
Ind.-Year-Qtr. YES YES YES YES YES
County FE YES YES YES YES NO
Firm FE NO NO NO NO YES
Observations 102,742 94,061 89,914 102,742 77,662
Standard errors in parentheses
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
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Table AVI: Cash Balances: Partitioning on Total Assets This table partitions our reduced-
form analysis on borrower total assets. Large rms are those with over $100 million in total assets,
while small rms are those with less than $100 million in total assets or unreported total assets.
All columns regress ∆Cashit on Abnormal Snow. All columns include four-digit NAICS x year-
quarter xed eects. Odd (even) numbered columns also include county (rm) xed eects. The




(1) (2) (3) (4)
Abn. Snow −0.002 −0.003 −0.020** −0.014
(0.004) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011)
Industry x Year-qtr FE YES YES YES YES
County FE YES NO YES NO
Firm FE NO YES NO YES
R-Squared 0.058 0.354 0.140 0.411
Observations 77,599 56,609 23,971 18,948
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Table AVII: Partitioning 2SLS Results on Borrower Size This Table presents 2SLS estimates
of IV regressions of ∆Drawit (Columns 1 and 2), ∆Line Sizeit (Columns 3 and 4), and ∆Cashit
(Columns 5 and 6) on instrumented Cash F lowit and controls. We instrument for Cash F lowit with
Abnormal Snow (using Column 2 of Table 2 as our rst stage). This table partitions the sample
on borrower total assets, dening large rms (presented in even numbered columns) as those with
over $100 million in total assets and small rms (presented in odd numbered columns) as those with
less than $100 million in total assets or unreported total assets. All columns include the same set
of control variables as in column (3) of Table 5, four-digit NAICS x year-quarter and county xed
eects. The standard errors are clustered at the four-digit NAICS 2012 industry level.
∆Drawit ∆Line Sizeit ∆Cashit
Small Large Small Large Small Large
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cash F lowit −0.827* 0.007 −0.992* −0.095 0.115 0.378**
(0.424) (0.126) (0.518) (0.147) (0.200) (0.171)
Industry x Year-qtr FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
County FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 77,599 23,971 77,599 23,971 77,559 23,971
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